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Abstract 
A rich understanding of macro-economic outcomes requires taking into account the large (and 
increasing) differences between firms. These differences stem in large part from heterogeneous 
productivity rooted in managerial and technological capabilities that do not transfer easily between 
firms. In recent decades the differences between firms in terms of their relative sales, productivity and 
wages appear to have increased in the US and many other industrialized countries. Higher sales 
concentration and apparent increases in aggregate markups have led to the concern that product market 
power has risen substantially which is a potential explanation for the falling labor share of GDP, 
sluggish productivity growth and other indicators of declining business dynamism. I suggest that this 
conclusion is premature. Many of the patterns are consistent with a more nuanced view where many 
industries have become “winner take most/all” due to globalization and new technologies rather than a 
generalized weakening of competition due to relaxed anti-trust rules or rising regulation. 
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I. Introduction 
Increasingly, researchers have been using micro-economic data on firm differences to 
better understand macro-economic outcomes. It is now widely accepted that there is 
enormous cross-sectional heterogeneity in establishment performance even within 
narrowly defined industries. But what is less recognized is that these inequalities between 
firms have been increasing over time, not just in terms of productivity, but also in terms of 
sales - leading to a substantial increase in sales concentration across a wide range of 
markets. This polarization has also been evident in wages, with almost of the increase in 
earnings inequality happening between firms with rather little change in inequality within 
firms.  
The aim of this paper is to document some of the emerging facts on firm heterogeneity 
especially in terms of recent changes. It is designed to “set the scene” for discussions in 
terms of macro-implications, causes and policy responses. I do not aim to give definitive 
answers to what these changes imply in terms of specific policies, but I do speculate on 
some the potential policy implications towards the end of the paper.  
A theme of this paper is whether the increasing gap between large and small firms reflects 
an increase in market power due to a reduction in competition arising from (for example) 
weakened anti-trust enforcement. The fall in the labor share of GDP and the rise in 
estimated aggregate price-cost markups are consistent with a rise in market power. A 
generalized rise in market power can have several important (and often harmful) macro-
economic consequences. For example, there is much evidence that weakened competition 
undermines productive efficiency1 and it is clear that productivity growth has been very 
disappointing over the last decade across OECD countries. Even without cost 
inefficiencies, greater monopoly power is still a negative supply shock to the economy. In 
the long-run real wages will need to fall to restore an inflation rate consistent with the 
Central Bank’s target. This will mean a lower participation rate (as work is less attractive) 
and/or higher unemployment. 
1 See the survey in Van Reenen (2011a) for example 
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Although such arguments over rising market power from lax anti-trust enforcement should 
be taken seriously, I suggest a more nuanced view. There are other explanations of the 
increasing differences that do not rest on a generalized fall in product market competition. 
Indeed, an equally strong case could be made that the forces of globalization and new 
technologies have changed the nature of competition without necessarily diminishing it 
across the board. For example, if more markets are becoming “winner take all” as with 
digital platform competition, this will generate the dominance of “superstar firms” such as 
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google and Microsoft.  The success of such firms may be as 
much due to intensified competition “for the market” rather than anti-competitive mergers 
or collusion “in the market”.  Furthermore, even in lower tech markets like retail and 
wholesale, rapid falls in quality-adjusted ICT prices (information and communication 
technologies) may give larger firms - who can invest heavily in developing proprietary 
software - major advantages in logistics and inventory control management. 
We will discuss several pieces of evidence that are suggestive of some role for the superstar 
firm hypothesis. First, using firm-level data to decompose the changes in aggregate 
markups and labor shares, the vast majority of the changes are due to reallocation between 
firms towards larger, more productive and profitable firms. Most American firms have seen 
either no increase or a fall in their mark-ups and labor shares. Second, the industries 
growing most concentrated appear to have rising productivity and innovation which is 
consistent with reallocation to more efficient and innovative firms. Third, the qualitative 
trends of concentration and mark-ups seem similar across countries, which suggests global 
changes, rather than country specific institutional changes such as the relative weakening 
of US competition policy compared to Europe. None of these are dispositive, so we also 
look at other explanations – such as an increasing role for intangible capital. 
I focus on long-run secular changes rather than how price-cost markups change over the 
business cycle. Short-run fluctuations in markups are a very important research area, 
especially for New Keynesian models, which focus on sticky prices implying counter-
cyclical markups. The empirical evidence, however, casts doubt on this as markups appear 
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acyclical or even pro-cyclical (Nekarda and Ramey, 2013). Some of the methodological 
issues in estimating markups will also appear in the discussion below. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II lays out some facts on the level of firm 
heterogeneity and Section III focuses on changes over time. In Section IV I discuss 
alternative explanations of the increase in concentration and markups based on (i) declining 
competition and (ii) superstar firms. Section V gives some tentative policy implications 
and Section VI concludes. 
II. Productivity variation
II.A TFP differences at a point of time 
Chart 1 shows GDP per worker and TFP (Total Factor Productivity) for a large number of 
countries where the values are normalized to be 1 in the US (so a number like ½ on the 
vertical axis implies that a country has 50% of the TFP of the US). Two things stand out. 
First, it is clear that those countries with high TFP are also the countries with high GDP 
per worker, implying that capital accumulation cannot explain all of the differential wealth 
of nations.2 Second, it is striking that there is such a wide dispersion in TFP. Taken literally 
this suggests that it takes a Liberian worker a month to produce what an American worker 
can produce in a day with the same inputs. 
Many scholars have looked to firm heterogeneity to understand these stark developmental 
differences (e.g. see the review in Hopenhayn, 2014). Firm heterogeneity has a long history 
in social science. The first systematic empirical analysis focused on the firm size 
distribution measured by employment, sales or assets. Gibrat (1931) characterized the size 
distribution as approximately log normal and sought to explain this with reference to simple 
2 Development accounting (e.g. Caselli, 2005) focuses on how to account for these large cross-sectional 
differences across countries. It is the cross sectional analog of the Solow growth accounting approach. 
Gennaioli et al (2013) perform development accounting using cross sectional data from the regions within a 
large number of countries. They argue that an expanded view of human capital (which includes 
managerial/entrepreneurial skills) can account for most of the TFP differences.  
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statistical models of growth. In fact, the firm size distribution is closer to a power law is 
now well documented in every country in the world were data is available.3 
Today we are lucky to live in a world of large-scale (frequently near population) data on 
firms and establishments.4 These are usually from national statistical agencies that collect 
micro-data primarily to build aggregate information either at the industry or macro level. 
Increasingly, researchers have been granted confidential access to such government data 
(e.g. the Longitudinal Business Database of US establishments). A second major source is 
from the private sector. For example, Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis dataset has accounting panel 
data from about 200 million firms from almost every country in the world (e.g. Bajgar et 
al, 2018). Since this includes private companies, researchers can move beyond a focus on 
simply publicly listed firms such as Compustat. Liberalization of access to administrative 
data and rapid increases in computer power have enormously enhanced our capacity to 
store and interrogate these new micro-data sources.  
One of the robust facts emerging from the analysis of large-scale firm-level databases is 
the very high degree of productivity dispersion. For example, Syverson (2004, 2011) 
analyzed labor productivity (value-added per worker) in US manufacturing establishments 
in the 1997 US Economic Census and shows that on average, an establishment at the 90th 
percentile of the distribution had four times higher labor productivity than one at the 10th 
percentile in the same four digit sector. Even after controlling for other inputs the TFPR 
ratio is still two to one. Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2013) show that even 
larger differences exist for other OECD countries.5   
The aggregate TFP differences documented in Chart 1 are influenced by how different 
economies allocate output to firms of different productivity levels. For example, India, 
3 For example Hernández-Pérez et al (2006); Axtell (2011) and Garicano et al (2016).  
4 For simplicity I will use “firms” and “establishments” more or less interchangeably for convenience. This 
abstracts from a growing literature looking at reallocation across plants within the same firms (e.g. Bloom et 
al, 2017). 
5 The OECD team of Berlingieri et al (2017) describe similar large cross-firm differences using 15 OECD 
countries in their MULTIPROD database, using moments collected from Censuses run by the National 
Statistical Agencies of many countries. We discuss this in more detail below. 
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China and Mexico appear to allow less efficient firms to survive for much longer than in 
the US (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009, 2014). A large number of possible explanations present 
themselves that we will later examine, such as competitive intensity in the product market, 
labor, capital or housing market frictions, size-related regulations and other distortions due 
to corruption and arbitrary tax.  
II.B Aggregate Changes in Productivity over time
Solow (1957) found that the vast majority of the growth of output per worker in the US 
was due to growth in TFP rather than capital accumulation. The finding that TFP is at least 
as important as observable factors of production in such growth accounting exercises has 
been replicated for numerous countries. The traditional view is to analyze the productivity 
growth of a representative firm. This within-firm growth could be from innovation 
expanding the technological frontier outward or from the adoption of existing ideas by 
follower firms. 
By contrast, the Schumpeterian tradition has long emphasized the between-firm 
component. Much of aggregate productivity growth is from the reallocation of output away 
from less productive firms towards more productive firms. This reallocation can take place 
on the extensive margin as less productive firms exit and more productive firms enter.6 This 
is the traditional notion of creative destruction, which is a Darwinian force of natural 
selection. But reallocation can also take place on the intensive margin as market shares get 
reallocated among incumbents away from the least efficient and towards the more efficient 
firms. In either case these are between-firm effects that are distinct from the traditional 
within-firm effects. 
Bailey, Hulten and Campbell (1992) found that over a five-year period about half of a 
typical US industry’s TFP growth was due to the reallocation of output between 
6 Analysis of entrants has found that their measured productivity is surprisingly low, usually no better than 
incumbents. However, this appears to be due to an overestimation of their output price, because firm specific 
prices are usually unobserved and researchers use industry-wide price deflator instead. Foster et al (2008) 
show in industries where plant-specific prices are observed entrants typically price below the average 
incumbent, so revenues deflated by industry prices will lead to an underestimate of entrant output and 
therefore also their productivity.  
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establishments rather than ongoing incumbent within plant productivity growth. There are 
multiple ways in which to perform such statistical decompositions of productivity growth 
into within-firm and between-firm components.7 But whatever way this is performed 
subsequent work has confirmed that there is always a substantial between-firm/reallocation 
component. 
II.C Where do firm productivity differences come from?
What could explain these differences in productivity, and how can they persist in a 
competitive industry? One explanation is that the differences are just measurement error. 
Although there is certainly some measurement error, substantial productivity differences 
show up clearly even for quite homogeneous well-measured goods.8 It is also the case that 
higher measured TFP is positively related to firm size, growth and survival probabilities, 
which suggests that there is some signal. Further, there is substantial persistence in 
productivity, which would not be the case if measured TFP was just transitory errors.9  
What lies behind these firm-level TFP differences? There are two levels to addressing this 
issue. One level is the proximate causes of the differences and the second is more 
fundamental causes. This is like peeling the layers of an onion. If we discovered that all 
labor productivity differences were due to fixed capital like plant and machinery (i.e. no 
TFP differences) we would then have to address the question of why these differed. But at 
least observable capital would give us a proximate explanation. Consider one of the 
proximate causes of TFP differences – new technologies. The generation of technological 
innovation (as proxied by measures of R&D or citation-weighted patents) or the adoption 
7  See, for example, Olley and Pakes (1996) and Melitz and Polanec (2015) 
8 Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) study 11 seven-digit homogeneous goods (including block ice, 
white pan bread, cardboard boxes and carbon black) where they have access to plant specific output prices. 
They find that conventionally measured revenue based TFP (“TFPR”) numbers actually understate the 
degree of “true” quantity-based productivity dispersion (“TFPQ”) especially for newer firms as the more 
productive firms typically have lower prices and are relatively larger. Bartelsman et al (2009) show that 
measured TFPR will generally be correlated with true TFPQ but also with the firm specific price shocks. In 
the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) model heterogeneous TFPQ produces no difference in TFPR because the more 
productive firms grow larger and have lower prices, thus equalizing TFPR. But this is a knife-edge case. 
9 Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998, Table A.7) show that over a five-year period around one third of plants 
stay in their productivity quintile. White et al (2018) emphasis that the imputations the Census makes to deal 
with non-reporting of some items in the Economic Census causes TFP dispersion to be under-estimated rather 
than overestimated.   
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of technologies (e.g. robotics, AI, other ICTs, hybrid corn, new drugs, etc.) would therefore 
be the things to focus on. There is a huge literature on such observable measures of 
innovation and diffusion and their relationship to firm performance.  
Differences in the generation and use of new technologies, however, are not able to fully 
account for firm productivity spreads. First, even after controlling for a host of observable 
technology measures there remains a very large TFP residual. Second, the impact of 
observable technologies seems to vary systematically with the management and 
organization of the firm. This has most clearly been seen in studies of the effect of ICT on 
productivity (e.g. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002; Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 
2012). There is a very wide range of effects of ICT on productivity and the impact depends 
very much on the organizational and management practice in the firm.  
There is now a considerable body of evidence suggesting that management practices are a 
major reason for TFP differences. To measure management practices, we developed a 
methodology (World Management Survey, WMS) first described in Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007). In summary, we use an interview-based evaluation tool that defines and 
scores from 1 (“worst practice”) to 5 (“best practice”) across 18 key management practices 
relating to data collection/monitoring, targets and incentives. The WMS now covers 34 
countries and multiple sectors (e.g. manufacturing, retail, healthcare and education). More 
recently, we have developed the questions in a form that can be sent out with the standard 
Census Bureau surveys. These Management and Organizational Practice Surveys (MOPS) 
are being run in nine countries, with the largest samples in the US (which now covers over 
80,000 establishments in two panel waves – see Bloom et al, 2017).  
These surveys show large heterogeneity in firm-level management quality within every 
country. For example, Chart 2 shows this firm level dispersion for the different countries 
in the WMS, which broadly mimics the variation observed in productivity. As with the 
average productivity levels in Chart 1, the US has a very high management score, but there 
is large variation within the US and indeed every country. The American advantage over 
India is not because every US firm has managerial superiority over every Indian firm. 
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These management differences are strongly correlated with measures of firm performance 
such as productivity, size, and survival. And a number of randomized control trials and 
natural experiments suggests that this correlation is causal (e.g. Bloom et al, 2013; Bruhn 
et al, 2017; Giorcelli, 2017). Across countries, around a third of the aggregate TFP 
differences in Chart 1 are accounted for by the management scores, and around half of the 
US-EU TFP differences in the decade after 1995 (see Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 
2017). 
If these management and technological capabilities are so beneficial to firms, why are they 
not quickly imitated? There is certainly diffusion of capabilities over time, but there are 
many barriers to diffusion. This is the central topic of organizational economics which 
emphasizes issues of information, complementarities, incentives and collective action 
problems within the firm (Gibbons and Roberts, 2013; Rivkin, 2000).   
III. Increasing Differences between firms over time
Having established the fact of a large degree of firm heterogeneity in the cross section, I 
now move to a less well-known set of facts – that there has been an increase in many 
dimensions of firm inequality in the last few decades.  
III.A Concentration Trends
As discussed in the previous section, the most basic measure of heterogeneity is firm size. 
Gabaix and Landier (2010) were among the first to argue for an increase in average firm 
size in their explanation of increasing CEO pay. However, their measure of firm size was 
measure was stock market value, which can fluctuate for many reasons unrelated to 
fundamentals. But more critically, their sample was only over US publicly listed firms from 
Compustat. This has the problem that (i) it covers only around 30% of US employment 
(the very largest firms) and (ii) the Compustat sample changes in a very non-random way 
over time due to declining IPOs and the addition of many smaller high tech start-ups (see 
Davis et al, 2007).  
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In Autor et al (2017, 2018) we calculate measures of concentration for a consistent set of 
four digit (SIC) industries using the US Economic Census between 1982 and 2012. We do 
this for the 6 main Census sectors that cover over 80% of private sector jobs. Chart 3 
presents the data for each sector showing weighted average changes in four firm (CR4) and 
twenty firm (CR20) concentration measures. The data show sharp increases in 
concentration across the whole US economy in the last 30 years, with the growth generally 
stronger in the second half of the sample. A similar picture of generally rising concentration 
emerges from alternative measures such as the Herfindahl Index or CR1.  
This finding is consistent with other papers examining concentration trends. Council of 
Economic Advisors (2016) discuss various industry studies such as airlines and telecoms 
which have shown significant consolidation. Grullon et al (2016) also concludes that more 
than three-quarters of US industries have had an increase in concentration since 1997.  
Chart 3 shows that concentration has risen across industries within all six of the Economic 
Census sectors in a broadly secular way. Notice that the upper lines are for sales and the 
lower ones are for employment. Both measures of concentration have tended to rise, but 
sales concentration is greater than employment concentration at any point of time. This 
illustrates that many firms have “scale without mass” – e.g. many high revenue firms like 
Google and Facebook have relatively few employees (see Brynjolfsson et al, 2008). 
Furthermore, unlike other sectors, in manufacturing the growth in employment 
concentration is pretty flat compared to sales concentration. Some commentators have 
underestimated the growth of firm concentration by focusing on employment instead of 
sales (or value added) and on just the manufacturing sector instead of the whole economy. 
Another fact about concentration is that the trends are still there, but are more muted when 
we aggregate over the whole economy (or even look at the two- or three- digit level industry 
level). This illustrates that it not simply growth of conglomerates that dominate multiple 
industries causing these trends, but rather that firms are focusing in particular sectors where 
their core competency is stronger.  
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Finally, note that one might be less concerned if this increased concentration was 
accompanied by an increase in firm mobility. In other words, it could be very different 
firms who were in the top four in an industry in one year compared to being in the top 4 
five years earlier. There is certainly turnover at the top. However, there is no evidence in 
our data that this turnover has increased over time. If anything, firms in the top group in 
one Census year are increasingly likely to remain there five years later (so-called 
“persistent dominance”). 
What about other countries? The most comprehensive analysis of this issue is in a series of 
OECD reports using MULTIPROD, which is a firm level database they have constructed 
in co-operation with the national statistical agencies in many countries and so are broadly 
similar to the US Economic Census in Chart 3. Chart 4 is taken from Criscuolo (2018) who 
uses this data to show that, on average, within the 9 EU countries where comprehensive 
data is available, sales concentration has risen since 2000. This remains true when adding 
other non-EU OECD countries such as Australia, Japan and Switzerland. Some of the 
countries are small relatively to the US, so one might be concerned that the relevant market 
is geographically much wider. So an alternative is to look at concentration in each industry 
across Europe as a whole. Using this alternative measure the OECD also find increases in 
concentration since 2000.10 
III.B Productivity Dispersion Trends
The increase in productivity dispersion in the US has been pointed out in several papers 
(e.g. Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda, 2018) – see Chart 5 for example. Decker 
et al (2018) see this as one of many indicators suggesting a fall in US business dynamism 
(particularly since 2000). These indicators include a fall in the fraction of workers 
10 Gutierrez and Philippon (2017, 2018) have argued the opposite – that cocentration has been falling in the 
EU since 2000. The reason for the difference is that Gutierrez and Philippon use BVD Orbis data to calculate 
concentration rather than the near-population data used by the OECD. Orbis does a reasonable job at tracking 
sales in the largest firms, but (especially in the late 1990s and ealy 2000s) has very incomplete coverage of 
small and medium sized firms in many countries (Bajgar et al, 2018). Hence Orbis overestimates overall 
industry sales growth as it includes the increase in industry sales arising through expanding sample coverage. 
The OECD can reproduce Gutierrez and Philippon’s falling EU concentration when they use Orbis for both 
the numerator and denominator of concentration. But when they use the true industry size from population 
data in the denominator they reverse this result and find rising concentration as illustrated in Chart 4.  
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employed in young firms; slowing job mobility across firms and geographical areas; slower 
employment responsiveness of firms to TFP shocks and a falling number of start-ups. Bils, 
Klenow and Ruane (2017) have argued that observed increases in productivity dispersion 
are misleading because they could be generated by increased measurement error. This 
seems unlikely, however, as the LBD series in Chart 5 is based on administrative rather 
than survey data and there is little direct evidence that classical measurement error has 
increased over time. Furthermore, as White et al (2018) show, although there are errors in 
the raw Census data, the extensive cleaning and imputations performed by the US Census 
actually tend to underestimate the true level of productivity dispersion rather than over-
estimate it.  
Again, the OECD have examined this in 14 other developed countries. Chart 6 (Andrews 
et al, 2017) is also taken form MULTIPROD administrative data and documents an 
increase in both labor productivity and TFP dispersion, qualitatively similar to the US 
trends in the previous graphs (they also find these patterns in BVD Orbis company 
accounts).  
III.C Trends in firm-level pay dispersion
Labor economists have long pointed to large wage differences across individuals and, more 
recently to the big increase in individual earnings inequality that began in the US in the 
late 1970s. Most other countries followed, some more quickly (like the UK) than others 
(e.g. Card et al, 2013, show that the increase in German inequality only really started in the 
mid-1990s). A leading factor behind the wage inequality increase is the increasing return 
to skill, mainly driven by skill biased technical change.11 Institutional changes such as 
declining union power and falls in the real value of the minimum wage also played a role. 
Many authors long-suspected that there was a large between firm component to wage 
inequality (e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger, 1993; Faggio et al, 2010), but this was difficult to 
convincingly demonstrate as matched comprehensive employer-employee was unavailable 
11 See the surveys by Autor and Acemoglu (2011) on US evidence and Van Reenen (2011b) on the 
international evidence. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Machin and Van Reenen (1998) contain the early 
evidence on skill biased technological change and inequality. 
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in those countries where inequality had grown the most. This meant that one could not 
track within firm wage inequality across individuals. Further, the average wage at the plant 
level in Census type date is payroll divided by workers (or hours) and this can change due 
to changing worker composition (e.g. by skill group, age, etc. – variables which most 
Census data does not track). 
Recently, Song et al (2017) have used US Social Security Administration (SSA) data which 
is near population data following the same workers over time and across firms. This allows 
them to decompose the overall increase in individual earnings inequality into between firm 
and within firm components. Chart 7 shows that just about all of the increase in earnings 
inequality has happened between firms rather than within firms (except maybe for the top 
percentile, dominated by the CEO). In other words the oft-cited differences within 
companies between high and low paid workers explain very little of the increase in overall 
US earnings inequality.    
There could be many reasons for this – Song et al (2017) emphasis sorting of workers of 
different skill types between firms, with highly skilled workers increasingly only working 
in firms employing with other highly skilled workers (e.g. McKinsey vs McDonalds). But 
another reason could be that employees of high performing firms share in more of the 
quasi-rents generated by these firms. For example if a firm creates a new technology and 
thereby has a temporary market advantage, it will earn some above market return and 
workers may share in this. There is strong evidence that such rent-sharing is important, 
especially in innovative firms (see Van Reenen, 1996; Kline et al, 2017 and Card and Kline, 
2018 for a recent survey). 
Indeed, in their study of Germany using similar social security data, Card, Henning and 
Kline (2013) also find that a big part of the increase in individual earnings inequality is 
also due to between establishment differences. But they argue that a large chunk of this is 
due to workers sharing rents with increasingly different firms rather than just worker 
sorting.  
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III.D Summary on increasing differences
Not only are there enormous differences between firms at a point of time in terms of 
performance (as shown in Section II), these differences appear to be increasing over time 
in the US and other developed countries. I have focused on the evidence for dispersion in 
size, productivity and wages – three key indicators - but there is also evidence of increased 
dispersion of other firm measures such as rates of return on investment in public firms 
(Council of Economic Advisors, 2016). 
IV. The Weakening Competition Explanation
One popular explanation of the patterns documented in the previous section is that they 
reflect a generalized increase in product market power. Competition authorities often use 
the degree of sales concentration as a signal of market power – for example mergers 
between large firms are subject to additionally scrutiny if they are in very concentrated 
markets. The fact that the productivity gap has widened could reflect anti-competitive 
practices to prevent the less productive firms from catching up. And rent-sharing would 
mean a privileged elite of workers were able to share in the bounty from monopolistic 
practices (an example might be the high pay of workers in the financial services sector). 
In this section we evaluate the weakening competition argument by examining the evidence 
on markups (IV.A); look at possible causes of declining competition (IV.B) and briefly 
mention welfare implications (IV.C), which we link more explicitly with policy in Section 
V. In subsections IV.D and IV.E we detail an alternative perspective – superstar firm 
models and look at the empirical evidence that could distinguish this model from the 
weakening competition story (IV.F). Finally we examine some alternative explanations in 
subsection IV.G. 
IV.A Evidence – Markups and the Labor Share
Concentration is a crude measure of market power partly because of the difficulty of 
defining the relevant market. A more direct approach is to try to measure producer price-
cost markups. The well-documented decline in the labor share of GDP – see Chart 8 - is 
broadly consistent with a rise in markups. To see this note that in a wide class of imperfect 
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competition models (e.g. Hall, 1988)12, one can write the markup 
i  of firm i’s ratio of its 
price ( ip  ) to its marginal cost ( ic ) as: 
/v vi i is  (1) 
where v
i  is the output elasticity with respect to a variable factor v and 
v
is  is the factor 
share, the cost of factor v in total revenue (i.e. /v v vi i i i is w x p q  where w  is the factor price, 
x the factor quantity and q the firm’s output). This implies that the markup can be estimated 
from just a production function parameter and a variable factor share.  For example, in a 
representative firm model with a time invariant Cobb-Douglas production function we can 
write the markup as a function of the labor share at time t as: 
/L Lt ts  (2) 
Hence, the fall in the labor share is the inverse of the rise in the markup. Using Chart 8 we 
see the labor share fell from about 64% in 1982 to 58% in 2016. If 2 / 3L  , for example, 
this implies that the markup rose from 4% in 1982 to 15% by 2016 (1.04 to 1.15). 
There are many issues with accurately measuring the labor share of GDP such as the 
treatment of the property sector; the income of the self-employed and business owner-
managers; differences between net and gross GDP, etc. Although such corrections affect 
the magnitude of the fall of the labor share, the fact that there has been a fall in the US and 
other OECD countries seems robust to different ways of dealing with these issues (e.g. 
Karabounis and Neiman, 2014 and Autor et al, 2018 focus on the corporate sector). 
An alternative to relying on equation (2) to take a more direct approach of measuring 
capital. Barkai (2017) uses macro-economic data and calculates the share of profits ( ) in 
GDP ( PY ) since the early 1980s using the accounting formula: 
1
L
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PY PY PY
    
       
    
(3) 
12 Formally, equation (1) requires only cost minimization with respect to a variable factor (no adjustment 
costs) and a production function that is continuous and twice differentiable in its factor inputs.  
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He finds that the profit share has risen because both the labor share and the capital share 
have declined, which is consistent with rising market power. The capital share is more 
challenging to calculate than the labor share as one needs to robustly calculate the 
opportunity cost of capital (r). Karabarbounis and Neiman (2018) revisit Barkai’s 
calculations over a longer period (from 1960) and broadly replicate the results, but label 
the residual profit share as “factorless income” highlighting the uncertainty over the 
measurement of the risk-adjusted user cost of capital and the capital stock.13 They also 
emphasize that profit shares appear high in the 1960s and 1970s, before falling in the early 
1980s, a pattern driven mainly by sharp swings in the interest rate. 
Given the difficulty with macro-economic estimates, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) use 
US Compustat firms to estimate a version of equation (1). They econometrically estimate 
two-digit industry specific production functions to obtain the output elasticity with respect 
to the sum of variable costs and then divide these estimates by the factor revenue shares.14 
They reach the dramatic conclusion that aggregate markups have risen from 1.1 to 1.6 
between 1980 and 2015. One challenge is separating variable costs from fixed costs in the 
company accounts. They use “cost of goods sold” (COGS) as their measure of variable 
costs. This is potentially problematic because this may include some fixed cost components 
and it may also miss out other variable costs.  Traina (2018) shows that using all operating 
expenses results in markups that do not grow very dramatically as the COGS share of 
revenue has declined a lot.15 However, an even more important concern with their paper is 
(as noted in the previous section) is that generalizing from publicly listed can be dangerous 
because of the serious sample selection problems both in a point of time and over time, 
making it very hard to describe robust macro-economic trends.  
Others have estimated markups using administrative data which is much more 
representative of the economy as a whole. Hall (2018) uses industry level data and also 
13 We discuss the measurement of intangible capital below. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2018) prefer the 
explanation of an increase in the user cost as the most plausible explanation. However, it is very unclear why 
the risk premium should have risen so much since 1980. 
14 This is the de Loecker and Warzynski (2012) method, which is an application of Hall (1988) to micro-data. 
15 The other big operating expense apart from COGS is Sales and General and Administrative Expenses, 
SGA. Traina shows that SGA has increased substantially for firms over time. 
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finds an increase in aggregate markups over time.16 Autor et al (2018) use Census micro-
data to estimate markups using both accounting approaches (as in Antras et al, 2017) and 
also econometric estimation (as in de Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). Like de Loecker and 
Eeckhout (2017) and Hall (2018) they also find increases in the aggregate markup. 
However, they find little change in the unweighted average or median firm markup (either 
from direct production function estimation or accounting exercises). This mirrors their 
finding on the changes in the labor share – the fall in the labor share is due to reallocation 
towards large, high margin firms rather than a general increase in the markup across all 
firms.  
Looking more generally across 26 OECD countries between 2001 and 14, Calligaris et al 
(2018) use equation (2) to estimate markups and also find that although the size-weighted 
average (i.e. aggregate) mark-up has risen17, most firms have not seen increases in their 
individual markups. This is also the conclusion of Baqaee and Fahri (2017) and is again 
consistent with the reallocation effects stressed by Autor et al (2018). We discuss the 
interpretation of this more below.  
IV.B Implications of weakening competition
A generalized increase in market power has many worrying implications (see de Loecker 
and Eeckhout, 2017). Because of lower allocative efficiency it directly leads to higher 
prices, an inflationary force that cannot be effectively counteracted by monetary policy 
(see Section V). Secondly, there is loss of efficiency as market power tends to inhibit 
productivity which will be a further upward pressure on costs and prices. Third, these 
forces will all feed into lower real wages. Fourth, Lower average wages makes working 
less attractive and so could lead to lower participation rates, something observed in the US, 
especially for men.  
16 Unfortunately, his instrumental variables (categories of government defense spending) have no variation 
across industries and would be collinear with time dummies. Not including time dummies raises the concern 
of omitted variables violating the exclusion restriction. The change in markup is imprecisely estimated.  
17 Calligaris et al (2018) use BVD data (firm accounts). De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) also use firm 
accounts (Worldscope data) from developing countries as well as OECD countries and claim that markups 
have risen in every Continent. None of these sources are based on administrative data, so the sample selection 
problems are an issue again, especially for developing countries. 
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IV.C Possible causes of rising market power
What might have caused an increase in market power? Proponents have a difficult time 
pinning down plausible explanations, but anti-trust and regulation are the two most cited 
culprits.  
Anti-trust Policy 
One view is that US anti-trust enforcement has weakened over time. Grullon et al (2017) 
claim that there was a significant decline in antitrust enforcement during the administrations 
of George W. Bush and Barack Obama (e.g., Harty, Shelanski, and Solomon, 2012; Crane, 
2012). Use of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which allows antitrust agencies to prevent increase 
in market power of existing dominant firms, has declined from an average of 15.7 cases per 
year over the period 1970–1999 to fewer than 3 over the period 2000–2014. Global activity in 
mergers and acquisitions surpassed $5 trillion in 2015, about $2.5 trillion of which was in 
the US, the highest amount in a year on record. Between 1998 and 2008 the FTC essentially 
stopped enforcing mergers when there were at least 5 firms remaining in the market (Kwoka, 
2017). Wollman (2018) points to the amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in late 2000 
which allowed many more exemptions for merger notification and shows evidence that it 
lead to more anti-competitive mergers.  
Other measures of anti-trust enforcement, however, exhibit opposite trends. For instance, 
Council of Economic Advisors (2016) provide evidence of increased cartel enforcement in 
the form of fines/penalties and prison sentences (e.g. from $0.36 billion in 2004 to $1.3 
billion in 2014). In the 1990s under Clinton there was a spike in anti-trust enforcement, 
perhaps most famously in the moves against Microsoft in the browser wars. And the 
competition authorities in the EU have actually been strengthened in the last 20 years 
leading to many high profile cases, such as the recent $5.1bn fine on Google.18 
18 Gutierrez and Philippon (2018) correctly point to various ways in which EU competition policy has been 
toughened and contrast this with the US where they argue it has deteriorated. They then argue that there has 
been a fall in concentration in the EU compared to a rise in the US. As discussed above, however, OECD 
analysis of near population administrative datasets (as opposed to their selected BVD subsamples) actually 
shows a rise in concentration in the EU as well as the US. This casts doubt on a purely institutional 
explanation of the trends. 
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A related issue is common ownership of many stocks by financial companies such as 
Blackrock. These institutional owners have become larger and more concentrated 
themselves. Azar et al (2015, 2016) have argued that increasing common ownership of 
corporations by banks and other financial institutions this has softened price competition 
between firms. Yet, there is little direct evidence that these large shareholders are at all 
active in pushing for such co-ordination. 
Regulation 
Regulation could reduce competition in at least three ways: (i) regulations often have a big 
fixed cost component which benefits larger firms; (ii) regulation may introduce barriers to 
entry; and (iii) increased rent seeking may allow larger firms to affect regulation through 
lobbying, thereby strengthening their position as leaders.  
Some have argued that the US has become substantially more regulated in recent decades. 
For example, financial service regulation has increased enormously since the credit crunch 
(e.g. Dodd-Frank), as has healthcare regulation (e.g. American Care Act, ACA) and 
environmental regulation. Gutierrez and Philippon (2017) show a secular increase in the 
Mercatus Regulation index since 1970.19 Kleiner and Krueger (2013) show a large increase 
in occupational licensing – this creates a barrier to entry making it harder to start a new 
business in some services. For example, the share of workers in occupations requiring some 
sort of State license grew fivefold over the last half of the 20th century.  
Yet not all indicators show moves to greater regulation. The more standard OECD index 
of product market regulations shows broad stability for the US from the late 1990s to today. 
And this index also shows substantial de-regulation in the EU over this time period. 
Furthermore, as with anti-trust, one could also point to many ways in which there have 
been significant deregulatory activities over time, especially under Reagan in the 1980s 
when concentration was also rising. In many ways the regulation under Dodd-Frank and 
19 In the 2002-2012 period they show a (weak) positive relationship between increases in this measure of 
regulation and concentration in very broad industries (NAICS 3). 
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the ACA were in response to crises arising, in part, from the heavy concentration of the 
banking sector (“too big to fail”) and healthcare markets. So the new regulations may be 
more effects than causes of greater concentration. 
IV.D An alternative perspective on market power: Superstar Firms
The rising market power argument has many attractions as it seems to explain disparate 
and surprising macro trends. But on one level it is still quite puzzling. As discussed above, 
it is not clear that institutional factors such as anti-trust and regulation have moved in a 
strong anti-competitive direction. And many other major changes would lead observers to 
believe that markets have become more competitive over time. Trade costs have declined 
over the last 40 years as more countries have signed up to the rules-based trading system 
under the WTO. In particular, China’s re-integration into the global trading system and in 
particular its Accession to the WTO in December 2001 has been a major pro-competitive 
shock to the OECD markets (e.g. Draca et al, 2016, Autor et al, 2013). Non-tariff trade 
barriers have also fallen with “deep” regional integration such as the development of the 
EU’s Single Market.  
Technological change has helped reduce the frictions to product markets within and 
between countries. Shipping is less expensive and with digital goods essentially costless 
and communication costs have fallen dramatically. The internet has enabled firms to enter 
each other’s markets more aggressively (think of Amazon) and for consumers to more 
easily compare prices (and characteristics) of goods and services online.  
It may seem more natural to think that these new technologies and globalization trends 
would make markets more competitive, rather than less competitive. 
An important insight from classic debates in Industrial Organization between Bain (1956) 
and Demsetz (1973) over the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (see Schmalensee, 
1987) has been lost in many recent discussions. Increases in market toughness can go hand 
in hand with many of the trends we have documented. For example, in Autor et al (2018) 
we show this in the context of a simple model with heterogeneous firms and imperfect 
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competition, but the intuition is straightforward.20 As discussed in Section 2 if firms differ 
in their productivity and markets are not perfectly competitive more productive firms will 
have bigger market shares. Furthermore, these large “superstar” firms will tend to have 
higher profit margins and lower labor shares of value added.21 If market competition rises 
(e.g. consumers become more price sensitive) then more output is allocated to the larger, 
most productive firms – i.e. concentration rises. This can be through the extensive margin 
(less productive badly managed firms exit) and the intensive margin (amongst the 
survivors, high productivity firms get even larger market shares). Hence an increase in 
competition could easily lead to rising concentration. 
What about the aggregate labor share and price cost margin? For any individual firm a rise 
in competition will mean its price-cost margin tends to fall (and labor share of value added 
rises) when market toughness increases. But offsetting this “within firm” effect is the 
“between firm reallocation” effect that moves more market share towards the high margin, 
larger, more productive firms when competition rises. If the underlying skewness of 
productivity is great enough, this reallocation effect dominates and aggregate markups rise 
and the labor share falls when market toughness increases. In this case we will see an 
increase in concentration and an increase in the aggregate/industry markup arising from an 
increase in competition. 
The lesson from this simple analysis is that we cannot conclude from aggregate industry 
wide changes in concentration and mark-ups, etc. that competition has fallen. One needs 
to look into more detail at the micro-data. As noted above, Autor et al (2018) find that the 
labor share and markup has hardly changed in 30 years for the typical US firm. What 
20 The model is a generalization of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) to allow for more general productivity 
distributions (rather than just Pareto) and any demand structure that satisfies “Marshall’s Second Law of 
Demand” that the absolute elasticity is falling in consumption (rather than just linear demand). 
21 The exception to this is if markups are the same across all firms because the elasticity of product demand 
in constant as in the Dixit-Stiglitz CES preferences case. Although a workhorse macro model, this is actually 
a knife-edge case. For any utility function consistent with Marshall’s Second Law of Demand (demand is 
more inelastic at lower prices), more productive firms will have higher markups because they face a less 
elastic part of the demand curve. Autor et al (2018) show that markups are higher (and labor shares lower) 
for establishments and firms within four digit industries. 
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explains the fall in the aggregate labor share and rise in the markup is a reallocation towards 
the larger and more productive firms.22 
A more specific version of this superstar firm hypothesis is to consider “winner takes most” 
markets. Higher competition in general will give firms with a cost or quality advantage a 
large share of the market. But the growth of platform competition in digital markets has 
led to dominance by a small number of firms such as internet search (Google), ride sharing 
(Uber), social media (Facebook, Twitter), operating systems for cellphones (Apple, 
Android), home sharing (AirBnB), etc. Network effects mean that small quality differences 
can tip a market to one or two players who earn very high profits.  
The growth of such industries does not mean that competition has disappeared, rather its 
nature has changed. There is more competition “for the market” rather than “in the market”. 
IV.E The Role of Information and Communications Technology
We have discussed the superstar firm explanation of the trend towards higher concentration 
in the context of (i) high tech digital markets engaging in platform competition and (ii) a 
general increase in market toughness due to globalization and/or the Internet. But a third 
reason why larger firms may expand more relates to the ICT revolution. Quality adjusted 
ICT prices have been falling dramatically for some time, meaning that there were huge 
opportunities for firms who could exploit this opportunity effectively. For example, 
retailers like Wal-Mart were able to develop deeply integrated supply chain networks based 
on proprietary logistical software. More efficient logistics, higher turnover of inventory, 
and greater product variety at lower cost gave these big box retailers major advantages over 
smaller chains and independent Mom ‘n’ Pop retailers (e.g. Foster, Haltiwanger and 
Kirzon, 2006). This proprietary own-account software is also a feature of many other 
industries, such as banking and online shopping (Amazon), giving large players 
competitive advantage. 
22 The same conclusion on the importance of reallocation are in Kehrig and Vincent (2017), Hartman-Glaser 
et al (2016) and de Loecker and Eeckhout (2017). 
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Bessen (2017) finds that US industries since 2002 with greater software developer 
employment (a proxy for proprietary software) had faster growth in concentration ratios, 
profit margins and plant sizes). Bauer and Lashkari (2018) analyze French firm-level data 
with rich measures of IT software and hardware. They find that larger firms use IT much 
more intensively than smaller firms and show that there has been a large reallocation of 
output (and rising IT intensity) in these firms.23 This helps explain the fall in labor shares 
in France. 
This is suggestive evidence that part of the growth of superstar firms is related to the fall 
in price of ICT (as suggested by Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2013). But the mechanism is 
not through a general substitution towards capital, but rather a reallocation of output 
towards highly profitable and more IT intensive companies. 
IV.F Distinguishing between declining competition vs. Superstar Firms explanations
Is the increase in aggregate markups and concentration due to a general fall in competition 
or rather a change in the economic environment reallocating more activity towards 
superstar firms?  
If the increase in the aggregate markup reflects weakened anti-trust enforcement this will 
generally lead to worse allocative efficiency, higher prices and lower productivity as 
discussed above. On the other hand if it is due to tougher markets reallocating more output 
to the more efficient firms this should lead to higher productivity.  
We can shed light on these alternative explanations by examining the changing 
characteristics of the industries that are becoming more concentrated. Autor et al (2018) 
find that the US four-digit industries with the greatest increases in concentration have also 
had higher TFP growth and a faster growth in innovation (as measured by such indicators 
as cite-weighted patents). Ganapati (2018) and Bessen (2017) also find a positive 
23 Formally, they argue that the production function is non-homothetic across different factor inputs. In 
particular, a proportionate increase in firm size has a larger proportional effect on the demand for IT capital 
than non-IT capital and labor. They test for this by estimating factor demand equations with size on the right 
hand side instrumented by market size shocks (e.g. from foreign markets). 
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relationship between concentration growth and productivity changes. 24 Looking across all 
the Economic Census data 1977-2012 Ganapati (2018) also finds little correlation between 
increases in prices and changes in concentration, as would be as would be expected if 
concentration was being driven by weaker competition (Peltzman, 2018, reaches the same 
conclusion).  
These pieces of evidence do not seem consistent with the simple story of falling 
competition lying behind increasing size differences, as the concentrating industries appear 
to be the more dynamic sectors.25   
One implication of this discussion is that to understand the aggregate productivity 
slowdown we have to look elsewhere for explanations than simply declining competition. 
Fortunately, there are no shortage of alternative hypotheses such as mismeasurement, the 
rapid build-up of intangible capital investments in new technologies such as AI and 
automation, declining R&D productivity, secular stagnation, continued financial frictions, 
demographic changes or even a return to the 1974-1994 trend.26 Unfortunately, there is no 
consensus (yet) on which ones – if any - matter the most (see Syverson, 2018, for an 
overview). 
Finally, it is useful to reflect on the finding that the main trends of increasing differences 
appear to be broadly common across the OECD. Institutional changes across countries – 
for example, anti-trust, regulation, union power, the minimum wage  - have evolved in very 
24 This is consistent with the empirical evidence discussed earlier that product market power tends to generate 
lower productivity. The most compelling evidence from this body of work looks at natural experiments which 
exogenously shift competition rather than simple correlations with concentration in product markets (which 
as noted could come from decreases or increases in competition). 
25 A caveat to this conclusion is that the evidence of faster productivity growth in the concentrating sectors 
does not imply that the simple “tougher competition” is correct. We would expect to see stronger falls in 
prices in these sectors under this model. The fact that prices have not fallen more robustly could be interpreted 
to mean that leading firms are increasing productivity and market power together (although it may also mean 
that prices are being overestimated by failing to properly account for quality changes). This would push 
towards one of the other versions of the superstar firm model based on platform competition and/or ICT). 
26 From 2005 through 2015, US labor productivity growth averaged 1.3% per year, down from a trajectory 
of 2.8% average annual growth sustained over 1995-2004. It was 2.7% per year from 1947-1973, then fell to 
1.5% per year over 1974-1994. 
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different ways in the US and EU. Although these institutions clearly may play some role, 
the global similarity of the changes suggest that something more fundamental is at play. 
IV.G Other explanations
Overhead Fixed costs and Intangible capital. 
The evidence suggests that aggregate mark-ups over marginal costs have increased. 
However, it may be that there has also been a rise in fixed overhead costs. If this is the 
case, higher margins are necessary for firms to stay in business over the longer-run. Indeed, 
in the long run almost all fixed costs become variable. Perhaps the most obvious candidate 
for these costs are those related to “intangible capital”. Many types of capital are hard to 
measure (e.g. firm specific human capital from training and goodwill capital from 
advertising). Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2009) describe the technological and managerial 
competencies discussed in Section 2 as scientific capital and organizational capital 
respectively. Since these investments are generally treated as current expenses in company 
and national accounts, this mismeasurement could help explain some of the patterns we 
observe. In terms of equation (3), the argument would be that true K has risen much faster 
than observed K, keeping the profit share constant. Certainly, the evidence in Corrado et al 
(2018) suggests that intangible capital is becoming an ever-larger share of total capital.  
In one sense, intangible capital is simply a form of measurement error and it is always 
possible to rationalize any empirical pattern in this way. As is well known, the biases could 
just as easily lead to overestimate of TFP as an overestimate.27  Karabarbounis and Neiman 
(2018) consider how an intangible capital model could generate the measured rise in the 
aggregate markup discussed above. They argue that it is hard to rationalize the trends in 
this way (intangible capital would have had to be particularly high in 1960-1980 for 
example). 
27 Assume intangible capital is treated as an expense, such as an intermediate input. During a period when 
current intangible investment growth exceeds intangible capital stock growth this will caused measured TFP 
growth to be too low compared to real TFP growth (this is one explanation of the current productivity 
slowdown). However, when the stock growths faster than the current flows, the opposite is true – we 
overestimate actual TFP growth (see Brynjolfsson and Syverson, 2017, for example). 
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Do the larger and more productive firms simply have more intangible capital than their 
smaller counterparts? Of course, one would need to discuss why larger firms were 
accumulating more intangible capital in this way. The Corrado, et al (2009) framework is 
a neoclassical representative firm approach and so is silent on this. As noted above, Bauer, 
and Lashkari (2018) find that large firms are more IT intensive and De Loecker and 
Eeckhout (2017) argue that they are also more SG&A intensive (one measure of overhead 
or intangible capital). However, the latter find that the increase of SG&A as a fraction of 
sales is too low to rationalize the increase in mark-ups over marginal costs.   
One difficult issue is that there may be increases in expenditure on the sunk costs of entry. 
It is unclear how these are accounted for. If entry costs are reflected in R&D then in 
principle these should be picked up, but it is likely that not all R&D is measured especially 
for new firms and, in any case, entry costs go beyond formal R&D expenditure.  
Ultimately, the only way to adjudicate the role of intangible capital is to try to improve 
measurement and see how much of the increased variance in size, productivity and wages 
can be explained with these factors. There has been progress here. R&D and software are 
now capitalized in the national accounts of the US. As noted in Section 1, we have been 
able to better account for more of the cross firm and country sectional differences in 
measured TFP with better indicators of technology and management.  
Outsourcing/Offshoring. 
Firms are increasingly outsourcing and offshoring activities into global value chains. This 
may be related to some of the trends we observe. For example, Song et al (2017) speculate 
that increased between-firm earnings dispersion might be due to high wage/skill firms 
increasingly outsourcing their low wage jobs such as cleaners to specialized service firms.28 
As with intangible capital, however, to account for increasing differences the story would 
have to be not only that these sourcing activities have become easier, but also that larger 
28 Domestic outsourcing cannot of course explain the fall in the aggregate labor share as these outsourced 
workers will still show up in other firms (unless these workers were earning some wage rents before – see 
Godschmidt et al, 2017).  
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firms have a particular advantage in them. While this is likely for offshoring, it is not so 
clear for domestic outsourcing. Smaller firms are increasingly able to outsource online 
many activities such as payroll, accounting, hiring and marketing that would formerly have 
to be performed in-house.  
In summary, although offshoring may account for some of the rise in markups, the fact that 
we also observe rises in markups for purely domestic firms and industries suggests that this 
mechanism this cannot fully explain the patterns we observe. 
Slowing technological spillovers 
Andrews et al (2015) argue that the increasing TFP gap between leading and laggard firms 
is due to a slower rate of diffusion. We would expect that over time, small low productivity 
firms catch up with large/high productivity leaders through imitation and adoption of the 
know-how of the leading firms. If this has become increasingly hard, inequality will 
increase between firms. So rather than a change in market environment this is more like a 
change in the ability to imitate. The problem with this story is that one would have thought 
that better ICT should lead to faster rather than slower technological diffusion. It is possible 
that there are other barriers (if erected by leading firms then we are closer to the diminishing 
competition hypothesis) such as stronger IP, lower inter-firm mobility of skilled labor, etc. 
But there is no clear evidence so far that I know of that would corroborate this. 
V. Some Policy implications 
I have focused more on positive than normative issues in this paper. But I speculate a little 
on policy issues in this section.29 
V.A Anti-trust Policy 
If the increase in concentration and markups reflects weakening anti-trust enforcement then 
an obvious policy solution is to strengthen it again. Similarly if overly onerous regulations 
or lobbying are the root causes then the policy implications is obvious. 
29 For a more formal treatment of the welfare effects of rising markups see Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2018). 
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Even if it is the case that the world is closer to the superstar firm model, however, this does 
not mean that anti-trust should be weakened. If superstar firms attain their dominant 
positions on the merits, it does not mean that they will always use their market power for 
the good of consumers. They have incentives to entrench their position through lobbying, 
erecting entry barriers and buying up future rivals. In the technology sector, the main exit 
strategy of Venture Capital-backed start-ups is now to be eventually acquired by a tech 
titan rather than aim for an IPO.30 The current merger guidelines focus on horizontal 
competition, but the risk may be that future competition is weakened by such acquisitions. 
The acquisitions by Facebook of Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014, for example, 
could be seen as problematic because these social media platforms may have become a 
major future rival to Facebook’s platform in the absence of the merger.  This implies that 
anti-trust policy needs to be re-thought in the era of superstar firms. There are many actions 
of dominant incumbents to maintain their market power not just through M&A but also 
through other strategies which can be used to strengthen incumbent advantage (such as the 
control of consumer data).   
This leaves an important role for the modernization of competition rules to reflect the 
changing nature of product market competition.31 But what are the implications for 
monetary policy makers? We consider these next. 
V.B Monetary Policy in the long run and the short run 
If the increase in concentration and markups reflects institutional changes such as 
weakening anti-trust enforcement or poor regulations then, as discussed above, this will 
lead to inefficiently higher prices and a lower equilibrium real wage. This is a structural 
supply side problem that monetary policy authorities can do little to directly offset in the 
30 Cunningham et al (2018) show theoretical and empirical evidence that many acquirers kill off promising 
innovations in the acquired as these threaten their monopoly rents from incumbent technologies. 
31 For some recent thoughts on how to do this see Tirole (2017) and the recent Chicago Stigler Center 
conference https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/events/single-events/antitrust-competition-conference-
digital-platforms-concentration. Tirole emphasizes that the burden of proof US cases must be shifted, as the 
authorities face a near impossible standard in proving that the dominant firm’s actions will very likely lead 
to the foreclosure of future markets. 
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long run. In the short-run things depend on how nominal wage setting changes. With some 
nominal wage rigidity, we would expect a Central Bank to have to tighten monetary policy 
in the face of a negative supply shock in order to induce a negative output gap and so bring 
inflation back to target. The degree to which is does so will depend on the slope of the 
Phillips Curve and the Central Bank’s relative weight on output stabilization vs. departures 
from its inflation target.32 Eventually, the new constant inflation equilibrium will be 
characterized by lower real wages and lower employment. On the other hand, if nominal 
wages respond flexibly to the negative supply shock of increased market power, the real 
wage consistent with stable inflation will be reached more quickly, and the Central Bank 
may not need to tighten policy. 
On the other hand, if the trends of increased concentration and markup levels reflect 
technological and globalization changes favoring superstar firms, the implications are not 
so malign. Rather than lower real wages, we may expect to eventually observe higher 
productivity, lower prices and higher real wages.  
Since the global financial crisis, inflation has been quite dormant despite the continuation 
of the trend towards rising markups and concentration rates. At a crude level, this would 
suggest that the negative supply shock story is missing something. One reason could be 
that superstar firm models better explain the trends. Of course, there may be many 
alternatives such as offsetting shocks to worker bargaining power and secular weaknesses 
in investment. 
The basic point, however, is that it matters for monetary policy whether one perceives the 
product market trends as a negative supply shock or something potentially more benign. 
V.C Monetary Policy Effectiveness 
Finally, consider a Central Bank seeking to stimulate investment in a downturn by reducing 
interest rates. To the extent that the mechanism works through (at least temporarily) 
32 For simple expositions of this idea, see Carlin and Soskice (2015) or Carney (2017). 
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lowering the cost of capital, the size of the markup could matter. In standard macro-models, 
markups are constant across firms and time so the level of the markup will not matter, 
because a 1% percentage decrease in marginal cost is passed through to a 1% decrease in 
prices. But if mark-ups are variable (as is suggested by the trade evidence on incomplete 
markups and the firm heterogeneity literature) 33 then a firm will generally take some of a 
cost decrease in the form of higher profits rather than just increasing inputs. Thus, a firm 
with a high markup will increase investment less than more a competitive firm when 
interest rates fall. This will tend to make any given decrease in interest rates less effective 
in a high markup economy.34 Higher markups and incomplete pass-through also slows 
down reallocation and so further reduces productivity growth (Decker et al, 2018).   
VI. Conclusions
Analyzing the macro-economy often requires getting “under the hood and” understanding 
the vast diversity of firm experience. We have shown that there are enormous differences 
in the productivity of firms within narrow sectors and that this is linked to their 
technological and managerial capabilities.  This fundamental heterogeneity helps explain 
differences in the wealth of nations across countries and also aggregate productivity growth 
over time.  
In recent years firm heterogeneity appears to have increased rather than narrowed. These 
increasing differences are most obvious in terms of size: sales concentration has 
mushroomed across most US industries, but it is also discernible in terms of wages and 
productivity.  
33 Markups are the same across all firms in Dixit-Stiglitz models of preferences which is common in macro 
models with monopolistic competition models. But there is now much evidence that markups are different 
across firms (as with the evidence from Autor et al, 2018, discussed above). In particular they are greater for 
larger firms as is consistent with trade models such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). The extensive pass-
through literature also suggests that costs are incompletely passed on to consumers which is consistent with 
variable markups (Arkolakis et al, 2018; de Loecker et al, 2016). 
34 Gutierrez and Philippon (2017) argue that the fall in investment as a share of GDP in the US despite 
increases in Tobin’s Q is a sign of weaker product market competition. 
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Increased concentration brings with it the concern of market power and indeed, some have 
argued that many of the economic ills we face today in terms of sluggish productivity and 
real wage growth are due to rising monopoly power. My view is that this conclusion is 
premature. Rising aggregate markups and concentration may also reflect changes in the 
nature of competition where superstar firms are rewarded with greater market share in 
“winner take most” markets. I have offered some evidence more in line with the nuanced 
superstar firm model than a general fall in competition due to anti-trust and regulation. But 
this is for sure not the final paper in this area, however, and there are substantial 
uncertainties. 
A final word of warning. Even if it was the case that the world is closer to the superstar 
firm model, this does not mean that anti-trust policy should be relaxed. Even if superstar 
firms attain their currently dominant positions on their merits of out-competing rivals, it 
does not mean that they will always use their power for the good of consumers. They may 
well try to entrench their position through lobbying, erecting entry barriers and buying up 
future rivals. As larger parts of the modern economy become winner take most/all, it is 
important that competition authorities develop better tools for understanding harm to 
innovation and future competition, rather than the traditional emphasis on the pricing 
decisions of current rivals. 
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